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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Following a lengthy trial, a jury found for plaintiff 
companies on all of the breach of contract and tort claims 
submitted to it and it returned a verdict of $48 million in 
compensatory damages and more than $100 million in 
punitive damages. The District Court denied the 
defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for 
a new trial but granted a remittitur reducing the award of 
punitive damages to $50 million. Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. 
EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 681, 685 (D.N.J. 1997). 
On appeal, defendants focus on certain of the bases for 
recovery, but, understandably, direct their most vigorous 
critique to the sizable damages awards, primarily that for 
punitive damages. The role of gatekeeper over such punitive 
damages verdicts is one of the most challenging that has 
been placed upon appellate judges in civil cases. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS 
 
A. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Orthofix S.r.l., an Italian company, manufactures medical 
devices, including a product known as an external bone 
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fixator, which is used to hold severely fractured bones in 
alignment, thereby obviating the need for repeated surgery. 
It is wholly owned by Orthofix, N.V. of the Netherlands, 
which itself owns Inter Medical Supplies, Ltd., a Cyprus- 
based company that is the worldwide distributor of the 
Orthofix bone fixators. These entities will be referred to 
collectively as "Orthofix." 
 
Biomet, Inc., an Indiana company, manufactures 
orthopedic devices and owns Electro-Biology, Inc. Electro- 
Biology in turn owns EBI Medical Systems, Inc., a New 
Jersey-based corporation that sells external bonefixators. 
These entities will be referred to collectively as "EBI." 
 
Beginning in 1983, EBI and Orthofix entered into a series 
of distributor agreements pursuant to which EBI served as 
the exclusive distributor in the United States, Canada, and 
the Caribbean Basin for various orthopedic devices, 
principally external bone fixators, manufactured by 
Orthofix. The last of these agreements went into effect on 
June 1, 1990, and expired on May 31, 1995 (the 
"Distributor Agreement"). For some eleven years, EBI and 
Orthofix shared what each agrees was a profitable business 
relationship, grossing approximately $30 million in sales 
annually and controlling one-third of the United States 
bone fixators market. 
 
The present dispute arises out of the 1990 Distributor 
Agreement between the parties. Under paragraph 8 of the 
Agreement, Orthofix agreed to promptly supply EBI with 
"such quantities of the products as [were] ordered from 
time to time." In turn, EBI agreed under paragraph 6(k) to 
"maintain in its inventory, at all times, a quantity of 
Products reasonably necessary to meet [EBI's] resale 
requirements for at least two months." In paragraphs 6(f) 
and (g), EBI agreed to distribute and sell Orthofix's 
products in conjunction with the Orthofix trade name, but 
promised not to appropriate that name as part of its own 
corporate designation. Both parties agreed not to disclose 
proprietary information obtained from the other. 
 
Finally, EBI consented to restrictions on its ability to deal 
in competitive products. Specifically, in paragraph 6(d) EBI 
undertook 
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       not to distribute, sell, promote the sale of, or in any 
       way handle during the term of this Agreement and for 
       one (1) year after its early termination by EBI any 
       product which could reasonably be deemed competitive 
       with the [Orthofix] Products. 
 
Despite the excellent results from their mutual efforts, 
the business relationship between EBI and Orthofix 
deteriorated during the last year of the June 1990 
Distributor Agreement. When EBI and Orthofix 
representatives met in June 1994 to negotiate a renewal, 
the relationship collapsed due to a dispute over the division 
of sales revenues. In anticipation of the termination of the 
Agreement, each party took steps in an effort to protect its 
own long-term business interests. Orthofix sought and 
located a new distributor, and on May 8, 1995, it 
announced that it had acquired American Medical 
Electronics, which became Orthofix, Inc. Upon the 
expiration of the Agreement with EBI in June 1995, 
Orthofix, Inc. became the exclusive United States 
distributor of the Orthofix fixator. 
 
For its part, EBI responded to the impending severance 
of its relationship with Orthofix by beginning development 
of its own external fixator, "Dynafix," with sales of that 
fixator to begin after expiration of the Distribution 
Agreement. It is EBI's conduct in anticipation of and after 
termination that led to this litigation. 
 
B. 
 
LITIGATION 
 
1. Complaint, Answer, Counterclaim 
 
In November 1995, Inter Medical Supplies sued EBI in 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey for failure to pay for several shipments of products 
sold during that year. At approximately the same time, 
Orthofix, Inc. and Orthofix S.r.l. also filed suit against EBI 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Texas, alleging breach of contract of the 1990 Distributor 
Agreement; misappropriation of trade secrets; patent 
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infringement, 35 U.S.C. S 271; violations of the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1114, 1125(a); unfair competition under 
Texas law, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. S 16.29; fraud 
under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 56:8-2; common law unfair competition; intentional 
interference with prospective contractual relations; 
defamation and trade libel; and injurious falsehood and 
product disparagement. 
 
On EBI's motion, the Texas case was transferred to the 
New Jersey District Court. EBI then answered and 
counterclaimed for breach of contract, tortious interference 
with both the 1990 Distributor Agreement and EBI's other 
customer and business relationships, fraud, defamation, 
violation of the Lanham Act, breach of the distribution 
franchise on New Jersey statutory and common law 
grounds, and other breaches and torts arising from the 
parties' contractual relationship. 
 
The parties proceeded with discovery and pretrial. In one 
significant in limine ruling on a key clause in paragraph 
6(d) of the Distributor Agreement, the District Court ruled 
that the language of the clause prohibited EBI from 
developing during the term of the agreement any product 
competitive to those it was distributing for Orthofix. See 
Orthofix, Inc. v. EBI Med. Sys. Inc., Civ. Action No. 95-6035 
(SMO), at 14 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 1997) (hereafter In Limine 
Ruling). 
 
2. Trial 
 
The jury trial began on April 7, 1997, and lasted two 
months. At its conclusion, the jury responded to special 
verdict questions by finding in favor of Orthofix on its 
claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage, tortious interference with contract, 
defamation, unfair competition, and violation of the 
Lanham Act. EBI does not contend on appeal that the 
evidence was insufficient for the jury to find it liable for 
breach of contract. In fact, the District Court found, and we 
agree, that the jury could have concluded that EBI's plan 
involved the development and production of its own 
external bone fixator to compete directly with Orthofix 
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following the end of the distributorship. Inter Med. Supplies, 
975 F.Supp. at 685. Other evidence supported the 
conclusion that EBI's strategy was to convert present 
Orthofix purchasers to the new EBI fixator and to drive 
Orthofix from the North American market. EBI started the 
process of bringing its own fixators to market in July 1994, 
although it did not formally place its product on the market 
until August 1995. 
 
In addition to developing its new, competitive product, 
EBI ordered vast quantities of the Orthofix products and 
parts it was then distributing. From October 1994 to May 
1995, EBI began ordering Orthofix product in amounts far 
in excess of its two-month inventory needs. It eventually 
stockpiled inventory sufficient to meet its needs for sixteen 
months. There was evidence that to achieve this result, EBI 
hid its stockpiling of Orthofix products by ordering and 
paying for products through third parties. For nearly one 
year EBI also failed to provide Orthofix with a series of 
required quarterly reports of its sales and inventory levels, 
further preventing Orthofix from promptly learning of EBI's 
excessive ordering. 
 
Once the final Distributor Agreement terminated at the 
end of May 1995, EBI began to take advantage of the 
market it had earlier created for Orthofix products. There 
was evidence that in order to continue to have such 
Orthofix products available to it, EBI acquired Orthofix 
product components through third parties. Its employees 
used reverse engineering to analyze the construction of 
these Orthofix components and then substituted EBI- 
manufactured parts for genuine Orthofix ones. EBI never 
informed medical professionals of the substitution, in effect 
passing off EBI's own components for those of Orthofix. 
 
When the new EBI bone fixators ultimately appeared on 
the market, EBI promoted them through practices the jury 
could have found deceptive. The sales force inaccurately 
described the fixators to purchasers as upgrades to or 
newer versions of the Orthofix products that EBI had been 
selling for years. At the suggestion of EBI's president, 
James Pastena, salespersons falsely stated that EBI elected 
to terminate the distributorship because the Orthofix 
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product line was inadequate for the needs of the medical 
profession. 
 
On the basis of this and like evidence, the jury found 
that EBI had both breached its contract with Orthofix and 
committed various torts. The jury awarded the Orthofix 
companies $48 million in compensatory damages. The 
verdict sheet, however, did not specify what portion, if any, 
of the $48 million compensatory damages award was meant 
to compensate the tort injuries and what portion, if any, 
was meant to remedy the contractual breaches. The jury 
also awarded $100,600,000 in punitive damages, which 
contained no breakdown by defendant or count. In a 
separate determination, the jury awarded Inter Medical 
Supplies $875,399 to compensate for EBI's failure to pay 
for products delivered at EBI's request. 
 
In response to EBI's counterclaims, the jury concluded 
that Orthofix had engaged in tortious conduct and 
breached the Distributor Agreement. It awarded one dollar 
in damages on the contract breaches and tortious acts, as 
well as granted a one-dollar set-off for Inter Medical 
Supplies' breaches in filling and shipping EBI's orders. 
 
3. Post-Trial Motions 
 
After the verdict, EBI moved for judgment as a matter of 
law or for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50. It also requested that the District Court 
grant a remittitur on the punitive damages assessment. EBI 
broadly attacked the trial and verdict, asserting that there 
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of liability 
under either a tort or a breach of contract theory, or to 
support the damages calculation. EBI claimed that the 
court failed to assure that the jury distinguished between 
tort and breach of contract damages. Finally, EBI alleged 
that the court failed to adequately respond to references 
Orthofix made in its closing to EBI's alleged violations of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 
 
The District Court rejected EBI's legal arguments on all 
issues except the punitive damages remittitur. See Inter 
Med. Supplies, 975 F. Supp. at 702-03. Deferring in great 
part to the jury, the court concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to support both the jury's findings of tortious 
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conduct and breach of contract and its calculation of 
compensatory damages. See id. at 686-88. In response to 
EBI's claim that Orthofix's allegations of FDCA violations 
prejudiced the jury, the court noted that it had submitted 
to the jury EBI's own proposed instruction for curing that 
error. See id. at 690-91. 
 
EBI also argued that because the jury failed to apportion 
the compensatory damages between the tort and breach of 
contract claims, instead awarding all such damages in a 
single sum, the punitive damages award could not be 
sustained because it could be applied only for tortious 
conduct, which had not been separately assessed. The 
District Court rejected that argument, observing it had 
instructed the jury on that issue and that the jury 
presumably understood the instructions. Although the New 
Jersey Punitive Damages Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 2A:15-5.9 
to .17, provides that punitive damages must be apportioned 
among defendants, EBI had not objected to the jury's 
failure to allocate, and the District Court found a waiver. 
See id. at 696-98. The court concluded that the jury could 
have found that EBI's tortious conduct was malicious and 
"accompanied by a willful disregard of the plaintiffs' rights," 
id. at 694, warranting punitive damages. Additionally, the 
court noted that the amount of punitive damages awarded 
fell within the range permitted by the Constitution and the 
New Jersey Act. 
 
However, the District Court exercised its authority to 
review the award for reasonableness under New Jersey law 
and reduced the amount of punitive damages to $50 million 
under the New Jersey Act. See Inter Med. Supplies, 975 F. 
Supp. at 698-702. The court concluded that the jury could 
not have found that the conduct between these private 
parties was likely to recur, see id. at 700; that cases 
involving purely economic harm and the enforcement of 
private rights, such as this one, warrant different treatment 
than do suits involving a "serious threat to public health," 
such as products liability suits, in which a defendant has 
placed a defective product into commerce and into the 
hands of unsuspecting consumers, id. at 700-01; and that 
the amount the jury awarded was unreasonable given the 
other factors in the case, see id. at 701-02. 
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The District Court issued its opinion and order on August 
28, 1997, and an amended judgment on September 2, 
1997. On September 26, 1997, EBI filed a notice of appeal 
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, presumably because, at one point, Orthofix's 
complaint included a patent infringement count. On 
Orthofix's motion, the Federal Circuit transferred the 
appeal to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1631, because 
Orthofix had abandoned the patent claim early in the 
litigation. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
EBI raises five claims on this appeal. Three of them are 
directed to the District Court's interpretation of the 
language of the Agreement and the effect of EBI's conduct; 
the latter two are directed to the damages awards. As to the 
Agreement, EBI claims that the District Court erred when 
it interpreted EBI's promise under paragraph 6(d) of the 
Distributor Agreement not to "in any way handle" 
competing products as prohibiting EBI from developing a 
competing bone fixator product while the agreement was in 
existence. EBI next asserts that the District Court erred in 
interpreting the Agreement as including duties of good faith 
and fair dealing as they pertain to EBI's orders for fixator 
products. It also contends that the District Court erred in 
concluding that EBI's over-ordering of products constituted 
tortious interference with Orthofix's prospective economic 
advantage. As to damages, EBI argues that the jury's award 
of $48 million was speculative and lacked substantial 
evidence. Finally, EBI vigorously argues that the punitive 
damages award, even as reduced, was the product of 
prejudice, violated New Jersey law, and was excessive and 
unreasonable. We review these contentions seriatim. 
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A. 
 
INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 6(d) 
 
In paragraph 6(d) EBI undertook "not to distribute, sell, 
promote the sale of, or in any way handle . . . any product 
which could reasonably be deemed competitive" with 
Orthofix's products. Before trial, EBI moved for an in limine 
ruling to preclude Orthofix's introduction of extrinsic 
evidence on the meaning of this paragraph. After a hearing 
and thorough consideration of the parties' arguments and 
submissions, the District Court denied the motion, holding 
that the handling clause unambiguously prohibited 
development of a competitive product during the term of 
the Agreement. We must consider at the outset whether 
EBI preserved this issue for appeal. 
 
Orthofix argues that EBI waived any objections that it 
might have had to either the District Court's in limine ruling 
or the court's subsequent jury instruction because EBI did 
not object to the District Court's construction of the 
"handle" clause at any time after resolution of the motion in 
limine. The issue was not raised during the course of 
formulating or giving jury instructions. And, EBI's own 
proposed instruction largely incorporated the construction 
to which it now objects, stating: 
 
       [T]he phrase "in any way handle" in Paragraph 6(d) of 
       the Distributor Agreement includes "a prohibition on 
       the development of a competitive product in the 
       marketplace." 
 
App. at 1477. Indeed, this was substantially the instruction 
given by the District Court without objection from EBI. Our 
recent precedents provide some guidance on this issue. 
 
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine 
Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1985), we 
considered whether a formal exception to the admission of 
evidence would be necessary to preserve that issue for 
appeal, if the court had already issued a definitive in limine 
ruling. There, the insurer, American Home, sought an in 
limine ruling to prevent the admission of evidence that it 
never prosecuted the arson on which it based its refusal to 
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pay the policyholder. The court refused to give the ruling 
that American Home requested, reasoning that the evidence 
was admissible. See id. at 324. After it lost at trial, 
American Home appealed, citing as error the admission of 
such evidence. The insured asserted that American Home 
had waived the claim when it failed to raise an objection at 
trial. We rejected that argument, explaining that the reason 
we require parties to raise objections or waive them is to 
assure that the court's attention is drawn to potential 
errors before it is too late to remedy them. See , e.g., Smith 
v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 
1998). We further held that this rationale is no longer 
applicable once a court has not only learned of the alleged 
error, but issued a definitive ruling that it is unlikely to 
reconsider in the future. American Home Assurance, 753 
F.2d at 324. We concluded that "requiring an objection 
when the evidence was introduced at trial would have been 
in the nature of a formal exception and, thus, unnecessary 
under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 46." Id. at 325. 
 
In our recent decision in Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
126 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 1997), we relied on American Home 
Assurance, articulating the applicable principle as providing 
that a party can preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal 
by, first, providing the court with a written motion 
including reasons and case authority, and second, 
obtaining a definitive ruling that does not suggest the 
matter will be reconsidered later at trial. Id. at 518. But see 
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1082-83 
(3d Cir. 1991) (Becker, J., announcing judgment of court) 
(discussing concerns raised where party's continued 
adherence to objection is unclear). 
 
The reasoning of American Home Assurance and Walden 
is persuasive here. Once EBI obtained a definitive ruling 
after full briefing on the disputed contract provision, there 
was little purpose in repeatedly raising the issue at trial 
because there was little likelihood that the court would 
revisit its decision. Nevertheless, Orthofix argues that we 
must review the jury instruction only for plain error 
because the District Court adopted, with only slight 
revision, the charge that EBI itself proffered. It may be that 
the same reasoning that supported our conclusion in 
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American Home Assurance and Walden that no objection 
was required when the evidence at issue was proffered also 
supports holding that EBI did not waive its objection by 
submission of its proposed charge. 
 
One could reasonably argue that the purpose underlying 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, which governs 
objections to jury instructions, would not be advanced by 
requiring a party to submit an instruction that contradicts 
a definitive in limine ruling or to object to a proposed 
instruction that incorporates that ruling. Cf. Smith, 147 
F.3d at 277. Under that theory, the initial definitive ruling 
decides the question for the case and satisfies the 
requirement of Rule 51 that the record contain "the matter 
objected to and the grounds of the objection." A litigant's 
attempt to revisit that ruling at the time of the jury 
instructions would use the court's time and resources 
inefficiently. 
 
We need not decide that issue here. Although in many 
cases the difference between plenary review and plain error 
review would be dispositive, in this case it is not, as the 
conclusion we reach using plenary review, which ordinarily 
applies when we review the District Court's interpretation of 
the contract, see Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d 
Cir. 1997), would necessarily be the same were we to apply 
the more restrictive plain error review. 
 
We now turn to consider EBI's objection to the District 
Court's in limine ruling. The gist of the dispute between the 
parties is whether to define the word "handle" broadly or 
narrowly, particularly in light of the prefatory phrase "in 
any way." Both parties contended in connection with the in 
limine ruling that the "in any way handle" clause was 
unambiguous, although they disagreed on its meaning. 
Here, EBI renews its argument that the clause is 
unambiguous. It then proceeds, relying on United States 
principles of contract interpretation, such as ejusdem 
generis, to argue that the language should be interpreted 
narrowly. Under the interpretation EBI proffers, the clause 
precluded it from distributing, selling, or marketing 
competing products, but not from developing such 
products. 
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It finds support for this definition from Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1027 (1961) (defining "handle" 
as, inter alia, "to trade in: engage in the buying, selling, or 
distributing of ") and from Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 866 (2d ed. 1987) (defining"handle" as, 
inter alia, "to deal or trade in"). 
 
Orthofix responds that the meaning of the "handle" 
clause is broad enough to include more than selling, 
distributing, and promoting, which activities already are 
listed in the contract, and that it also encompasses 
prohibition of any development by EBI of competing 
products. It notes that the dictionary also includes the 
following listings for handle: "2(b): to conduct oneself in 
relation to, assume an attitude"; "2(c)(1): manage, control, 
direct"; and "2(e): deal with, act upon, dispose of, perform 
some function with regard to." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1027; see also Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 866 (listing"11. to 
manage, deal with, or be responsible for" and"13. to 
manage, direct, train, or control"). Additionally, Orthofix 
denies that ejusdem generis has any application in this 
context. 
 
We observe that paragraph 15 of the Distributor 
Agreement provides: "This agreement shall be governed by 
the laws of the Republic of Italy." The parties introduced 
affidavits from experts in Italian law at the in limine 
hearing. According to the District court these experts 
effectively agreed that "because the Distributor Agreement 
was drafted in English, the terms of that agreement should 
be given their natural meaning in English." In Limine Ruling 
at 8. 
 
The District Court relied heavily on the dictionary 
definition of "handle," from which it construed the word to 
prohibit development of a product during the lifetime of the 
agreement. It explained that it construed the word 
expansively because of the prefatory words "in any way." 
See In Limine Ruling at 9. Additionally, the District Court 
was "not convinced that ejusdem generis is a canon of 
construction known to Italian law." In Limine Ruling at 10. 
Neither party has directed our attention to case law that 
 
                                14 
  
supports its expert's position, and apparently neither party 
provided the District Court with any such authority. 
 
Thus, there is no support for the contention that Italian 
law would permit courts of the United States to apply 
United States interpretive rules to a contract invoking 
Italian law. Even if it were appropriate to use such rules, 
we agree with the District Court that they could not be 
applied to restrict the meaning of the term "handle" 
because that term is immediately preceded by the phrase 
"in any way." Therefore, we conclude that the District Court 
did not err when it approached the question as one of plain 
meaning and relied on the ordinary dictionary definition of 
the words "in any way handle." 
 
We agree with the District Court that the inclusion of the 
phrase "in any way" suggests a broad interpretation of the 
term "handle" and supports the reading that Orthofix urges 
us to adopt. We thus conclude that the Agreement 
prohibited EBI from researching and developing a 
competing product during the tenure of that contract. 
 
As an alternative, EBI argues that if the clause is 
ambiguous, the District Court should have left the issue for 
the jury rather than relying on extrinsic evidence. But even 
if we were to engage in an inquiry whether the contract's 
language is ambiguous, we are satisfied that the District 
Court did not err in its analysis under that approach. "[A] 
contract is unambiguous if it is reasonably capable of only 
one construction." Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government 
of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Our case law sets forth the steps to be taken in 
establishing whether or not contract language is 
ambiguous. "To decide whether a contract is ambiguous, 
we do not simply determine whether, from our point of 
view, the language is clear. . . . Before making afinding 
concerning the existence or absence of ambiguity, we 
consider the contract language, the meanings suggested by 
counsel, and the extrinsic evidence offered in support of 
each interpretation." Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare 
Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 
Review of the District Court's disposition of EBI's motion 
in limine establishes that the court followed the required 
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steps in identifying ambiguity. The court considered the 
handling clause language, the dictionary definition of the 
phrase "to handle," and the context of the phrase. It 
analyzed and discussed the alternative meanings assigned 
to the phrase by counsel and explained that, in context, 
only one of these interpretations was reasonable. Finally, 
the court found that its construction of the handling clause 
was supported by extrinsic evidence regarding what 
Orthofix intended in insisting that the handling clause 
remain in the agreement. 
 
EBI argues that the District Court exceeded its authority 
in considering extrinsic evidence in support of Orthofix's 
interpretation of the contract. That extrinsic evidence 
included an internal memorandum dated June 6, 1990, 
from Robert Gaines-Cooper, group chairman of Orthofix, to 
Orthofix counsel Daniel Gilioli, which memorialized certain 
aspects of the negotiation of the Distributor Agreement then 
underway between Orthofix and EBI. In the memorandum, 
Gaines-Cooper wrote that he had rejected EBI's request to 
remove the phrase "in any way handle" from the Distributor 
Agreement so that EBI could develop a competing product 
during the final year of the Agreement. The court also 
considered a draft of the Distributor Agreement obtained 
from EBI files in which the words "in any way handle" were 
crossed out. 
 
Finally, the District Court held a hearing pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 104 at which Gaines-Cooper 
testified that it was his understanding that EBI wanted to 
develop a competing product and that he refused to remove 
the phrase "in any way handle" from the Distributor 
Agreement in order to prevent such development. 
Thereafter, the District Court engaged counsel in a lengthy 
discussion about the reliability of Orthofix's evidence, and 
concluded that there was "no extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the testimony of Mr. Gaines-Cooper or to 
impeach . . . the memorandum to [his counsel]." In Limine 
Ruling at 14. In arguing that this reliance on extrinsic 
evidence was misplaced, EBI ignores our precedent."Before 
making a finding concerning the existence or absence of 
ambiguity, we consider . . . the extrinsic evidence offered in 
support of each interpretation." Teamsters Indus. 
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Employees Welfare Fund, 989 F.2d at 135. As we stated 
there, "Extrinsic evidence may include the structure of the 
contract, the bargaining history, and the conduct of the 
parties that reflects their understanding of the contract's 
meaning." Id. 
 
We conclude that the District Court did not err in relying 
on extrinsic evidence and that, in light of all of the relevant 
factors cited by the District Court, the handling clause is 
"reasonably capable of only one construction." Tamarind 
Resort Assocs., 138 F.3d at 110-11. Thus, the District 
Court did not err in holding that the contract was not 
ambiguous and in concluding that the Agreement's "in any 
way handle" clause prohibited EBI from developing a 
competing bone fixator product during the term of the 
agreement. Therefore, it did not err in so instructing the 
jury. 
 
B. 
 
IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTY NOT TO OVER-ORDER 
 
EBI next takes issue with the decision that it breached 
the contract by over-ordering Orthofix products. It argues 
that the District Court erred in concluding that the contract 
contained an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing not 
to over-order. EBI further contends that there is insufficient 
evidence of the damages, if any, the alleged over-ordering 
caused and concludes that the entire compensatory award 
must therefore be overturned.1 
 
The parties agree that there is no express provision in the 
Agreement that prohibits EBI from ordering as much as it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Orthofix argues that EBI's motion for judgment as a matter of law was 
limited to the claim that Orthofix could not recover damages for alleged 
excess orders, assuming that those orders did breach EBI's implied duty 
of good faith, and, consequently, that EBI cannot now appeal on the 
claim that there was no implied duty. We reject Orthofix's claim, because 
EBI argued in its motion that it was entitled to order and sell as much 
Orthofix product as it wanted under the contract, see App. at 1386, 
1440, an argument that assumes the absence of an implied duty of good 
faith. 
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could purchase. EBI notes that paragraph 8 of the 
Agreement obligated Orthofix to "promptly supply. . . such 
quantities . . . as are ordered from time to time," without 
limiting that obligation in any way, see App. at 207, and 
that paragraph 6(k) required EBI to maintain an inventory 
level covering at least two months requirements, see App. 
at 206. Thus, EBI concludes, the contract specifically 
addresses what amount it could order, setting a minimum 
but no maximum. It then points out that under our 
decision in USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing Inc., 988 F.2d 433 
(3d Cir. 1993), "[t]here can be no implied covenant as to 
any matter specifically covered by the written contract 
between the parties." Id. at 439 (citation omitted). 
 
We need not decide whether EBI's argument would be 
persuasive under other circumstances because it is based 
on principles of United States contract law, whereas, as 
discussed above, the Agreement, by its terms, must be 
construed in accordance with Italian law. Therefore, we 
must attempt to ascertain whether Italian law would infer 
a duty of good faith and, if so, whether such a duty would 
include the obligation not to over-order. 
 
We engage in plenary review of a question of foreign law. 
See Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 
1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1994). "[E]xpert testimony is the most 
common way to determine foreign law. . . ." In the Matter of 
the Arbitration Between: Trans Chem. Ltd. & China Nat'l 
Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 275 (S.D. 
Tex. 1997), aff'd and op. adopted in relevant part, Trans 
Chem. Ltd. v. China National Mach. Import & Export Corp., 
161 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
 
Here, each party relied on the affidavits of its own expert. 
These experts reviewed the Agreement to determine whether 
it included an implied duty of good faith. They agreed that, 
under Italian law, it did. They disagreed, however, as to the 
content of the implied duty in this context, and hence as to 
the permissible level of EBI orders under Italian law. 
 
Orthofix's expert, Professor Piero Bernardini, working 
from the assumption that EBI purchased fixators"in excess 
of its actual requirements for the purpose of resale after the 
expiration of the Agreement," App. at 1334, described such 
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conduct as "manifestly in breach of the good faith duty in 
the contractual performance." App. at 1343. He concluded 
that although there was no language referring to a duty not 
to order excessively, the Agreement did link orders to EBI's 
"expected requirements." See App. at 1343. He found that 
linkage in paragraph 3 of the Agreement, which provides: 
 
       Firm orders for the products shall be placed with 
       Orthofix within the first fifteen (15) days of a given 
       month for shipment at least two (2) months from the 
       date of the order. With each of said orders EBI shall 
       provide Orthofix with a written forecast of its expected 
       requirements of the product for the three (3) 
       subsequent months commencing from the end of the 
       two (2) months period for which the said shipments are 
       intended. Such forecasts shall not be binding on either 
       party. 
 
App. at 203. 
 
In contrast, EBI's expert, Professor Fabio Emilio Ziccardi, 
interpreted the Agreement as a requirements contract 
under Italian civil law, and stated that, because the 
contract specified a minimum but no maximum amount of 
product, EBI was free to order any amount above the 
minimum, subject only to Orthofix's acceptance of that 
order. App. at 240-42. 
 
In the face of disagreement between experts on such 
matters, we may adopt any position that is supported by 
reasonable inferences either from the respective country's 
law or "from the implications of a legal concept such as a 
contract or testament or juristic personality." Merinos 
Viesca y Compania, Inc. v. Pan American Petroleum & Trans. 
Co., 83 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1936); cf. Mobile Marine 
Sales, Ltd. v. M/V Prodromos, 776 F.2d 85, 89-90 (3d Cir. 
1985) (rejecting Panamanian official's certification of due 
registration in favor of court's own reading of Panamanian 
law); In the Matter of Arbitration Between: Trans Chem. Ltd. 
& China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. at 
275 ("[F]ederal judges may reject even the uncontradicted 
conclusions of an expert witness and reach their own 
decisions on the basis of independent examination of 
foreign legal authorities." (citation omitted)). 
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We conclude that Orthofix's expert's interpretation of the 
Agreement is more reasonable because it relied on the 
language in the Agreement, particularly that in paragraph 
3 obliging EBI to provide Orthofix with a forecast of its 
expected requirements for the three months after the two- 
month order period. EBI's expert, on the other hand, relied 
more heavily on the absence of language. The contractual 
obligation that EBI provide Orthofix with a forecast of its 
need for the three months after its current inventory was 
likely to be exhausted, although not binding on either 
party, certainly suggested both that Orthofix expected EBI 
to keep its inventory fairly current and that there was a 
relationship between EBI's immediate inventory needs and 
its orders. There would be no need for such a provision if 
the parties intended to allow EBI to accumulate, without 
notice, inventory for sixteen months. Bernardini's 
interpretation also more effectively integrates paragraph 3, 
on which he relied, with three other paragraphs: paragraph 
6(e) (requiring EBI to forward to Orthofix, inter alia, 
monthly sales reports and "quarterly reports indicating the 
quantity of Products comprising EBI's inventory"), App. at 
205; paragraph 6(k) (requiring EBI to maintain inventory 
"reasonably necessary to meet its resale requirements for at 
least two (2) months"), App. at 206; and paragraph 11.1 
(requiring Orthofix to fill any order it accepted before the 
expiration of the Agreement), App. at 207. 
 
In light of these provisions, we are persuaded that Italian 
law would not give EBI free reign to order whatever it 
wanted so long as Orthofix accepted the orders and made 
some attempt to fill them. Thus, the District Court did not 
err when it accepted the position of Orthofix's Italian law 
expert that EBI had an implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing not to over-order Orthofix products. 
 
Moreover, even if this were a question of United States 
contract law, subject to plenary review, see Williams, 132 
F.3d at 946, we would find against EBI. As noted above, 
EBI's argument is that there can be no implied duty not to 
over-order because the contract specifically covers the 
issue. The principal provision to which it refers is 
paragraph 8, which covers Orthofix's obligation to fill EBI's 
orders. Even EBI's own Italian expert rejected that 
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construction, opining that the Distribution Agreement only 
specifies a minimum, App. at 241, and "clearly has no 
provision at all concerning the purchases `in excess,' " 
Supp. Affidavit S 4.4. In the absence of any provision that 
"specifically covers" the matter, we reject EBI's contention 
that United States contract law bars the covenant implied 
here by the Agreement. 
 
There was evidence to support the jury's finding that EBI 
over-ordered and stockpiled Orthofix products while 
actively misleading Orthofix about its need for additional 
product, thereby breaching the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Examining this evidence in the light most favorable 
to Orthofix, we conclude that the District Court properly 
denied EBI's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
 
EBI nonetheless contends that Orthofix failed to present 
evidence of the damages it claims to have suffered from 
EBI's sale of the excess products, and argues that therefore 
the entire damages award should be reversed. As we have 
previously observed, even when an entire theory of liability 
relied on at trial is subsequently held impermissible, the 
jury's finding of liability on a separate theory in a special 
verdict can sustain the award of damages. See Bonjorno v. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 806 (3d 
Cir. 1984); see also Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal 
Co., 6 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 1993). It follows that even if 
Orthofix failed to identify the damages caused by the sale 
of the over-ordered product, that would not negate the 
jury's liability verdicts on the three other contract breaches 
and the eight torts. Moreover, the case was not presented 
as a series of separate breaches of contract and tort, each 
of which caused separate defined damages. Thus, there is 
no basis to overturn the entire compensatory damages 
award. 
 
C. 
 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
 
In a related claim, EBI contends that the District Court 
erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law 
on the jury's verdict that held it liable for the tort of 
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interference with prospective economic advantage on the 
basis of its conduct in over-ordering bone fixators. EBI 
argues that the evidence did not establish that it lacked 
justification or excuse for its conduct, one of the required 
elements for the tort,2 and that "[b]reach of contract, 
without more, is not a tort." Appellants' Br. at 33 (quoting 
Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655, 
664 (3d Cir. 1993)).3 
 
EBI mischaracterizes Orthofix's position. Orthofix never 
argued that EBI's breach of the Agreement constituted a 
tort. Rather, it contended at trial that EBI improperly sold 
the fixators and, thereby, interfered with Orthofix's 
economic relationships. 
 
In denying EBI's post-trial motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on this issue, the District Court concluded 
that there was evidence that EBI used fraudulent and 
unlawful means to obtain the fixators and, just as 
important, that EBI then sold the fixators in direct 
competition with Orthofix. The court held that, from this 
evidence, the jury could have concluded that EBI engaged 
in tortious interference by over-ordering, regardless of 
whether the act of over-ordering breached the contract. 
Inter Med. Supplies, 975 F. Supp. at 687. 
 
We agree. Although Orthofix does suggest that some of 
EBI's conduct in obtaining the excessive quantities of 
fixators contributes to its tortious interference claim, it also 
emphasizes that EBI tortiously interfered by selling those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This tort requires proof of five elements: (1) plaintiff 's expectation 
of 
economic benefit; (2) defendant's knowledge of that expectation; (3) 
defendant's wrongful, intentional interference with that expectancy; (4) 
the reasonable probability of benefit to the plaintiff in the absence of 
that 
wrongful interference; and (5) damages. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1167 (3d Cir. 1993). EBI's appeal contends that 
there was a failure of proof on element (3). 
 
3. Orthofix again contends that EBI waived its appeal for this position, 
because EBI moved exclusively on the grounds of sufficiency of the 
evidence, not whether the conduct would amount to tortious 
interference. However, EBI did raise the claim that the conduct 
amounted only to breach of contract and not tortious interference in its 
Rule 50(b) motion. Thus, we reject Orthofix's argument. 
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products to the very customers that otherwise would have 
been purchasing from Orthofix. 
 
Moreover, the jury was entitled to conclude that EBI's 
proffered justification for its conduct did not completely 
explain its actions. EBI argued that the actions it took were 
defensive, designed to protect itself against the coming loss 
in business expected to result from the termination of its 
Orthofix distributorship. However, Orthofix introduced 
evidence that EBI's president described his company's post- 
Agreement relationship with Orthofix as a "war," and his 
objective as being to "destroy Orthofix." App. at 507. With 
this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that EBI's 
explanation for acquiring and selling the fixators was 
inadequate to explain its decision to compete in the market 
when and how it did, and that its conduct was tortious 
interference with Orthofix's prospective economic 
advantage. 
 
We conclude that the District Court did not err in 
denying EBI's motion for judgment as a matter of law on 
this ground. 
 
D. 
 
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
 
EBI next challenges the $48 million compensatory 
damages award, and asserts that the District Court erred in 
permitting Orthofix to recover any compensatory damages 
because the amount of such damages was speculative. In 
doing so, EBI expands on its argument that the District 
Court erred in denying the motion for judgment as a matter 
of law on the breach of contract and tortious interference 
counts because Orthofix failed to establish specific damages 
associated with each cause of action. Relying on our 
statement in Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 
1338, 1353 (3d Cir. 1975) --"we cannot permit a jury to 
speculate concerning the amount of losses resulting from 
unlawful, as opposed to lawful, competition"-- EBI 
contends that the jury's award here was impermissible 
speculation. 
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Although the award appears large, we review it keeping in 
mind the following observation by the District Court, which 
was intimately familiar with the case and the evidence: 
 
       In an effort to maintain their commanding position as 
       the leading United States marketer of external bone 
       fixators until such time as their own products could be 
       successfully launched, defendants attempted to secure 
       a large inventory of Orthofix products. That plan was 
       largely successful, and Orthofix is no longer a major 
       force in the United States market for external bone 
       fixation devices. 
 
Inter Med. Supplies, 975 F. Supp. at 685. EBI's actions thus 
secured for it the market that had previously been 
Orthofix's, an injury from which Orthofix has not recovered. 
 
EBI makes essentially three arguments against the award 
of compensatory damages: First, that Orthofix's consultant 
created flawed market projections, and that Creighton 
Hoffman, the Orthofix expert who ultimately testified, 
prepared damage estimates in reliance on these projections; 
second, that Hoffman's testimony departed from the 
consultant's analysis with respect to the recapture of profit 
and relied instead on inflated market share projections 
made by Orthofix's executives; and third, that Hoffman 
improperly inflated his damage estimates by taking sales 
growth data prepared by EBI's own damage experts out of 
context and applying it to a situation that did not reflect 
actual market conditions. 
 
These arguments echo those EBI presented to the District 
Court in a motion in limine and in motions for judgment as 
a matter of law. The court rejected EBI's arguments, 
focusing first on Hoffman's testimony and then emphasizing 
that "while [the analysis] certainly yielded a large number, 
[it] was not flawed as a matter of law. The jury could have 
rejected that testimony in its entirety. It did not." Id. at 
691. The court further observed that EBI's economic expert 
also testified and that the jury presumably took the time 
and effort to consider carefully the damages evidence each 
side presented. Id. 
 
The disputed calculation proposed lost profits not 
exceeding $95 million and actual damages not in excess of 
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that number. The District Court rejected EBI's complaint 
that the damages were "undifferentiated," noting that 
"[p]laintiffs tried this case on numerous alternative theories 
of liability each of which would support an award of`lost 
profits.' To the extent the plaintiffs prevailed on any theory 
which was supported by sufficient evidence, they are 
entitled to the full measure of compensatory damages, and 
no more." Id. Referring to Orthofix's expert's testimony, the 
District Court rejected EBI's complaint that Orthofix failed 
to present testimony separating the damages by entity and 
by claim. The court suggested that such specificity would 
have created jury confusion, as well as a strong potential 
for duplicative or excessive damages. Id. The court 
explained: 
 
       Because all of the claims upon which plaintiffs 
       prevailed arose from the same set of facts surrounding 
       the defendants' plan to convert the Orthofix external 
       fixator market to the purchase of Dynafix, and because 
       that plan succeeded, plaintiffs' lost profits need not be 
       assigned to a given legal theory. Damages ordinarily 
       flow from conduct, not from legal theories. 
 
Id. 
 
We review the District Court's denial of post-trial motions 
regarding that compensatory damages verdict for abuse of 
discretion. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 
U.S. 415, 437 (1996); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Regional Transp. Auth., 125 F.3d 420, 437 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
Although New Jersey law requires a "reasonably accurate 
and fair basis for the computation of alleged lost profits," 
J.L. Davis & Assocs. v. Heidler, 263 N.J. Super. 264, 276, 
622 A.2d 923, 929 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (citation 
omitted), the fact that a plaintiff may not be able to fix its 
damages with precision will not preclude recovery of 
damages. See American Sanitary Sales Co. v. New Jersey, 
178 N.J. Super. 429, 435, 429 A.2d 403, 406 (Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 1981). EBI's arguments addressing the reliability 
and source of Hoffman's data presumably were made with 
equal force to the jury. Hoffman was cross-examined at 
length, and EBI presented its own damages expert who 
painted a more conservative view of Orthofix's economic 
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prospects. The District Court properly held that the 
credibility of the experts was for the jury to determine, and 
we see no reason for concluding that there was an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
E. 
 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
 
The most troublesome issue on appeal is that presented 
by the jury's award of punitive damages in the amount of 
$100,600,000 remitted by the District Court to 
$50,000,000. 
 
EBI argues at the outset that we must reverse the 
punitive damages award because the jury's verdict, which 
does not distinguish between tort and breach of contract 
damages, leaves us no basis to apply the New Jersey Act, 
which limits a plaintiff 's punitive damages to either 
$350,000, or five times the compensatory damages, 
whichever is greater. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:15-5.14. It 
reasons that because punitive damages are not available for 
breach of contract, this court cannot determine whether the 
strictures of the New Jersey Act are met without 
determining what portion of the $48 million compensates 
for tort violations in this case. 
 
Orthofix responds that EBI waived this argument by 
failing to object to the jury instructions and the verdict 
sheet when they were presented. We agree. EBI's trial 
counsel did not object on the ground now pressed, either 
when the instructions and verdict sheet were given to the 
jury or when the jury returned.4 We believe, in line with 
other circuits, that EBI's failure to object at the time the 
jury received the proposed verdict sheet when the jury 
returned constitutes a waiver of this objection. See Austin- 
Westshore Constr. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 934 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court did address EBI's argument that the verdict sheet 
failed to distinguish among the various defendants, but found that the 
verdict was consistent with the defendants' own requested charge, which 
did not require the jury to list each award separately. Inter Med. 
Supplies, 975 F.2d at 697. EBI has not raised this issue on appeal. 
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F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 1991) (party waived objection to 
any inconsistency in jury response to special interrogatories 
by failing to raise issue before jury was excused); White v. 
Celotex Corp., 878 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1989) (same) 
Stancill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 
1974) (same). Even if this argument were not waived, the 
breaches of contract here were so intertwined with the 
tortious scheme to steal Orthofix's market that the full 
award is properly attributable to the tortious conduct. 
 
We turn then to EBI's challenge to the punitive damages 
award. EBI claims that the award, even as remitted by the 
District Court, is inconsistent with both the New Jersey 
Punitive Damages Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:15-5.9 et seq., 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 
It argues that the jury awarded punitive damages from 
passion and prejudice, that Orthofix failed to produce 
evidence of some defendants' financial condition as required 
by the New Jersey Act, and that even the $50 million 
punitive damages award is excessive. 
 
The standard of review that we apply depends upon the 
particular challenge asserted. To the extent that EBI 
complains about the admission of certain evidence, we 
review the District Court's ruling under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See Grizzle v. Travelers Health 
Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1994). To the 
extent that the issues EBI raises have a legal component, 
our review is plenary. See Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999). The Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. There are no reported New Jersey Supreme Court opinions that the 
parties have cited or we have found which interpret the Act. See Orson, 
Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("When a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction, it must apply the 
substantive law as decided by the highest court of the state whose law 
governs the action."). The Act requires a trial court judge to "ascertain 
that the award is reasonable in its amount and justified in the 
circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose to punish the 
defendant and to deter the defendant from repeating such conduct." N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 2A:15-5.14(a). The parties have not argued that this act 
expands protection against excessive punitive damages awards beyond 
the minimum guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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Court has stated that state law governs the propriety of 
awarding punitive damages and the factors to be 
considered in determining the amount, but that federal law 
controls "those issues involving the proper review of the 
jury award by a federal district court." Browning-Ferris 
Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 
(1989). 
 
1. Passion and Prejudice 
 
If it can be shown that a jury verdict resulted from 
passion or prejudice, a new trial is the proper remedy. See 
Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1362,1383 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
EBI argues that the sheer size of the award here 
demonstrates that the jury's decision was a product of 
passion and prejudice. However, in Dunn we declined to 
find that there is "some level of award that would in itself 
evidence prejudice and passion," and held that even if there 
were such a level, the award in Dunn, $25,000,000, would 
not have reached it. Id. 
 
EBI also argues that several statements made by Orthofix 
concerning EBI's counsel and EBI's alleged violations of the 
FDCA inflamed the jury and contributed to the prejudice, 
warranting reversal. The District Court rejected this 
argument, noting that EBI requested and received its own 
curative instruction. Inter Med. Supplies, 975 F. Supp. at 
690 ("[T]o the extent there may have been any prejudice, 
defendants sought and obtained a curative jury instruction, 
[and] the present assertion of prejudice is without merit.") 
Indeed, EBI represented to the District Court that the 
instruction given "perfectly addresse[d] the concern with 
FDA." Id. (citation omitted). 
 
We have reviewed the closing argument, the objections 
raised in the District Court, and the curative instruction. 
We do not find sufficient support for EBI's allegation of a 
connection between counsel's remarks in closing and the 
size of the verdict to warrant granting a new trial. This is 
especially true where EBI received the curative instruction 
it requested and did not object to any improper references 
to counsel during the closing argument. We conclude, 
therefore, that the District Court did not err in rejecting 
EBI's arguments that the verdict was the product of 
passion or prejudice. 
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2. Evidence of Defendants' Financial Condition 
 
EBI also challenges the award on the ground that 
Orthofix failed to provide evidence of some defendants' net 
worth. Under the New Jersey Act, a trier of fact assessing 
the award of punitive damages "shall consider . .. [t]he 
financial condition of the defendant," N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:15- 
5.12(c), in order to formulate an award which is "specific as 
to [each] defendant," N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:15-5.13. EBI 
argues that Orthofix failed to establish an essential element 
of punitive damages under New Jersey law by not 
producing evidence concerning the financial condition of 
two of the corporate defendants, Electro-Biology and EBI 
Medical Systems. 
 
There is some question whether this issue has been 
waived because it was not raised before the District Court. 
In any event, the record establishes that Orthofix did 
introduce evidence of both EBI Medical Systems' sales and 
revenues and Biomet's net worth. Arguably, these are an 
imperfect measure of the financial condition of Electro- 
Biology itself, but the corporate and accounting structures 
of these companies make this evidence adequate to meet 
the requirements of the New Jersey Act. EBI Medical 
Systems is the sales and marketing subsidiary of Electro- 
Biology, a company that has no sales of its own. Moreover, 
Biomet did not maintain separate balance sheets that 
would document separate net worth calculations for its 
subsidiaries. Thus, the District Court did not err in 
permitting an award of punitive damages. 
 
3. Excessive Damages 
 
Finally, we consider EBI's contention that the punitive 
damages award is excessive. EBI not surprisingly relies on 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), 
the case in which the Supreme Court first struck an award 
of punitive damages as excessive under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
In that case, an Alabama purchaser of a new BMW 
automobile sued the manufacturer for its failure to notify 
him that his automobile had been repainted. Under BMW's 
policy, it sold unused but repaired cars as new unless the 
cost of the repair exceeded three percent of the car's 
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suggested retail price. It gave the purchasers, including 
plaintiff, no notification of the repainting because the cost 
of that repair did not meet the policy's minimum. The 
plaintiff claimed that the repainting impaired the car's 
value by approximately ten percent of the $40,000 price, or 
$4000 in actual damages, and introduced evidence that 
BMW had sold nearly one thousand repainted cars. The 
plaintiff argued that the appropriate penalty was $4 million. 
Id. at 563-64. 
 
Alabama law permitted an award of punitive damages 
when a defendant engaged in "gross, oppressive or 
malicious fraud." Id. at 565. The jury concluded that 
BMW's nondisclosure policy constituted such fraud, and 
awarded both the requested actual damages and the $4 
million in punitive damages. Id. The Alabama Supreme 
Court reduced the award to $2 million because the jury's 
calculation included sales in other jurisdictions; it upheld 
the award in all other respects. Id. at 566-67. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court reaffirmed the 
states' traditional authority to punish and deter wrongdoers 
for acts committed within the jurisdiction, and noted that 
states have "considerable flexibility" in achieving those 
goals. Id. at 568. However, it cautioned that a state must 
avoid "grossly excessive" awards that "enter the zone of 
arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Observing that"[e]lementary 
notions of fairness" require "fair notice" to a defendant of 
both the conduct punishable and the severity of the 
potential penalty, the Court identified three "guideposts" as 
indicia of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award: 
"the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct]; the disparity 
between the harm or potential harm suffered . . . and [the] 
punitive damages award; and the difference between this 
[punitive] remedy and the civil penalties authorized or 
imposed in comparable cases." Id. at 574-75. 
 
The Court considered the degree of reprehensibility to be 
"[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award." Id. at 575. 
The Court observed that "some wrongs are more 
blameworthy than others" so that " `trickery and deceit' . . . 
are more reprehensible than negligence." Id. at 575-76. It 
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concluded that none of the aggravating factors were 
associated with BMW's conduct and observed that the 
plaintiff's injury was "purely economic in nature." Id. at 
576. The Court stated that although intentional economic 
misconduct warrants punishment, particularly if inflicted 
on a financially weak and vulnerable entity, "this 
observation does not convert all acts that cause economic 
harm into torts that are sufficiently reprehensible to justify 
a significant sanction in addition to compensatory 
damages." Id. Although punitive damages were warranted 
because BMW had intentionally omitted a material fact, the 
fact that the company also could have believed that it had 
no disclosure duty mitigated the egregiousness of the 
conduct. 
 
"The second . . . indicium of an unreasonable or 
excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual 
harm inflicted on the plaintiff." Id. at 580. The Court 
observed that it had looked to the ratio between the 
punitive and compensatory damages on other occasions. In 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23- 
24 (1991), it had held that a four-to-one ratio did not "cross 
the line into the area of constitutional impropriety," and in 
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources, Corp., 509 U.S. 
443, 460 (1996), it had held permissible a ratio that did not 
exceed ten to one once the potential harm to that plaintiff 
was taken into account. In considering the ratio guidepost, 
the Court observed that: 
 
       [L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly 
       support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, 
       if, for example, a particularly egregious act has 
       resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. 
       A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which 
       the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of 
       noneconomic harm might have been difficult to 
       determine. 
 
BMW, 517 U.S. at 582. 
 
In BMW, the Court followed its practice of declining to 
"draw a mathematical bright line between the 
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally 
unacceptable that would fit every case." Id. at 583 (citation 
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omitted). Rather, it stated that the concern should be for 
reasonableness. Id. In the case of the plaintiff purchaser of 
the BMW, the $2 million punitive damages award produced 
what the Court described as "a breathtaking 500 to 1" ratio 
between the penalty and plaintiff's actual damages, id. at 
583, and was thirty-five times greater than the total 
damages of all fourteen Alabama purchasers, id. at 582 
n.35. 
 
Finally, in discussing the third indicium of excessiveness, 
a comparison of the punitive damages and the potential 
civil or criminal penalties for comparable misconduct, the 
Court reiterated its deference to legislative judgments 
regarding appropriate sanctions. Id. at 583 (citing 
approvingly Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). The appropriate comparison, 
the Court suggested, is between the statutorily authorized 
financial penalty (when there is no imprisonment) and the 
punitive damages award. 
 
In explaining its decision to reverse the judgment on 
punitive damages and remand, the Court noted that BMW 
lacked any notice that its conduct, which would have given 
rise to a $2000 fine under the state's Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, Ala. Code S 8-19-11(b) (1993), could result in 
a multimillion dollar penalty, and that there was no basis 
for assuming that BMW, which did change its policy, would 
not have done so after receiving a lesser sanction. Id. at 
584-85. Even without drawing "a bright line marking the 
limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages 
award," the Court was convinced that the award in BMW 
was "grossly excessive." Id. at 585. 
 
The Supreme Court's decision in BMW provides us with 
an analytic framework to consider whether the now reduced 
$50 million punitive damages award remains excessive. In 
two recent cases, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
has applied the BMW criteria, concluding in both that the 
punitive damages awards were excessive even though not 
all three of the indicia of excessiveness identified by the 
Supreme Court were present. In Continental Trend 
Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 
1996), the jury awarded actual damages of $269,000 and 
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punitive damages of $30 million on claims of tortious 
interference with both prospective business advantage and 
contract. See id. at 635. Although the defendant was aware 
of the possibility of such a large award (one of the 
"guideposts"), the court of appeals directed a remittitur to 
$6 million because the harm inflicted by the defendant was 
purely economic in nature and the ratio between the 
compensatory and punitive damages was too high. Id. at 
640-42. In FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 1997), 
the court directed a reduction of punitive damages award 
from $1.2 million to $264,000 for similar reasons. 
 
The Tenth Circuit's summary of the factors to be 
considered in determining the degree of reprehensibility of 
a defendant's conduct is useful: whether it "cause[d] 
economic rather than physical harm; would be considered 
unlawful in all states; involves repeated acts rather than a 
single one; is intentional; involves deliberate false 
statements rather than omissions; and is aimed at a 
vulnerable target." Continental Trend Resources, 101 F.3d 
at 638; accord Hamilton, 122 F.3d at 861; see also Lee v. 
Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996) (identifying presence 
of violence, deceit or malice and the repetition of conduct 
as aggravating factors in determining degree of 
reprehensibility). 
 
Applying those factors, we note the harm inflicted on 
Orthofix was economic, rather than physical, and hence 
"less worthy of large punitive damages awards than torts 
inflicting injuries to health or safety." Continental Trend 
Resources, 101 F.3d at 638. It has been suggested that, 
"[w]hen the injury is economic, and particularly when it 
arises out of a contractual relationship where the parties 
can and should contractually protect themselves by 
providing for explicit remedies in the event of breach, the 
permissible ratio of punitive damages to actual damages 
should be relatively modest." Hamilton, 122 F.3d at 862. 
Relevant also is that Orthofix is not a financially weak or 
vulnerable target. Another factor that tends to mitigate the 
need for a high punitive damages award is the jury'sfinding 
that Orthofix itself breached the distributor agreement, 
failed to fill and ship EBI's legitimate orders, and engaged 
in tortious acts. 
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We recognize that the jury found, as instructed under 
New Jersey law, that EBI acted with either "actual malice" 
or "a wanton and willful disregard of persons who 
forseeably might be harmed," N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:15-5.12(a), 
that EBI's plan "involved acts of deception and, at least, 
reckless disregard of the consequences to Orthofix," Inter 
Med. Supplies, 875 F. Supp. at 700, and that those acts 
continued over an extended period of time with full 
awareness of the harm to Orthofix, see N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2A:15-5.12(b). 
 
Nonetheless, balancing these facts with respect to 
reprehensibility, we conclude that EBI's conduct, which 
inflicted only economic harm for which large compensatory 
damages have been awarded, was not sufficiently egregious 
to warrant a punitive damages award of $50 million. In this 
connection, we take into consideration that high, easily 
calculable compensatory damages may more appropriately 
be accompanied by a lower punitive damages ratio. See 
BMW, 517 U.S. at 582. 
 
Finally, we find reference to the sanctions for comparable 
misconduct (the third guidepost) unhelpful here, as there is 
no clearly applicable reference point. EBI offers two 
potential comparisons. First, it suggests that the $50 
million award here is higher even than the $30.5 million 
fine imposed for shipping adulterated medical devices that 
caused deaths, see United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. 
Supp. 287, 290 (D. Mass 1994), conduct far more 
egregious. Second, EBI notes that the potentialfine under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines calculation to 
deprive a defendant of the profit from his wrongdoing would 
be only $500,000, which is 1/100 of the punitive damages 
award here. See U.S.S.G. SS 8C2.4(a), 8A1.2, comment 
(n.3(h)). Orthofix counters that federal and state laws 
contain numerous authorizations for treble damages when 
a defendant engages in unfair business conduct and 
competition. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. S 15 (antitrust); 18 U.S.C. 
S 1964 (RICO); N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:4-2 (unfair trade 
practices). However, even trebling $500,000 would 
significantly reduce the punitive damages award from the 
$50 million figure. 
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Because we have concluded that the punitive damages 
award should be reduced in light of the first guidepost, we 
need not decide between these competing statutory 
comparisons. We agree with the Tenth Circuit's observation 
that "a violation of common law tort duties [may] not lend 
[itself] to a comparison with statutory penalties. The 
fundamental question is whether [the defendant] had 
reasonable notice that its tortious interference with 
contracts and prospective business advantage could result 
in such a large punitive award." Continental Trend 
Resources, 101 F.3d at 641 (citing cases involving high 
punitive damages awards for tortious interference claims). 
 
Once we have determined that a punitive damages award 
as high as that set here does not accord with the analysis 
recommended by the Supreme Court in BMW, we are left to 
fulfill our role as gatekeeper in reviewing an award of 
punitive damages. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1382. It is not an 
enviable task. We have searched vainly in the case law for 
a formula that would regularize this role, but have not 
found one. As we noted above, the Supreme Court has 
instructed as to the analysis but has provided nothing 
concrete as to the amount. Justice Kennedy's comments in 
his separate opinion in TXO reflect the frustration of many 
judges faced with the need to set a figure. 
 
       To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages 
       is grossly excessive begs the question: excessive in 
       relation to what? The answer excessive in relation to 
       the conduct of the tortfeasor may be correct, but it is 
       unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by 
       which to compare the punishment to the malefaction 
       that gave rise to it. A reviewing court employing this 
       formulation comes close to relying upon nothing more 
       than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive 
       damages award in deciding whether the award violates 
       the Constitution. This type of review, far from imposing 
       meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could 
       become as fickle as the process it is designed to 
       superintend. 
 
TXO, 509 U.S. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 
In the last analysis, an appellate panel, convinced that it 
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must reduce an award of punitive damages, must rely on 
its combined experience and judgment. When different 
members reach different figures, they must seek an 
accommodation among their views, a process that recurs 
throughout appellate decision making. After reviewing the 
record and the arguments in this case, we conclude that 
the proper, reasonable punitive damages award is no more 
than $1 million.6 
 
In his passionate dissent, Judge Garth argues that we 
have ignored our precedent as to the standard of review 
applicable to a district court's ruling on punitive damages, 
which he asserts must be accorded "heightened deference," 
particularly if the district court has previously granted a 
remittitur. The brief passage in our 1992 opinion in Keenan 
v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1992), to 
which he alludes, is not this court's latest writing on that 
issue. Instead, this court's 1993 opinion in Dunn, where we 
spoke en banc, represents our most recent and considered 
opinion on the issue of punitive damages, and particularly 
on punitive damages following a District Court remittitur. 
See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1382-91. 
 
In Dunn, we did not enunciate any rule of extraordinary 
deference to the district court's decision, as Judge Garth 
would have us adopt. Instead, although the district court 
there had reduced by remittitur the jury's punitive damages 
award from $25 million to $2 million (a considerably larger 
percentage reduction than that ordered by the District 
Court here), we nonetheless decided that an additional 
reduction was appropriate and reduced the already 
remitted damages from $2 million to $1 million. Id. at 1391. 
We stated that we were further reducing the punitive 
damages award because we believed that the "district court 
gave insufficient consideration to the effect of successive 
punitive awards in asbestos litigation." Id.  
 
We discussed at great length this court's role in the 
assessment of punitive damages. Contrary to Judge Garth's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because of the extent to which we have reduced the punitive damages 
verdict, we need not address EBI's contention that the $50 million award 
is excessive because it constitutes 3.3 percent of Biomet's net worth, far 
above the one percent we allowed in Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1383. 
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position, the en banc court stated: "We cannot leave the 
amount of punitive damages solely to the trial court 
because it is evident to us that the Supreme Court in 
Haslip approved review by an appellate court to `determin[e] 
whether a particular award is greater than reasonably 
necessary to punish and deter.' " Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385 
(alterations in original). 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the deference which we accord the 
trial court in such matters, and notwithstanding our 
commendation of "the district court's discipline in reducing 
the punitive damages from $25 million to $2 million," id. at 
1391, we undertook to further reduce the punitive damages 
upon our determination "that further remittitur of the 
punitive damage award in this case is appropriate," id. In 
light of that further reduction, the dissent's insistence that 
Dunn is not relevant to the standard of review when a 
district court orders a remittitur is surprising. The dissent's 
attempt to confine Dunn to product liability cases is 
unpersuasive. Haslip, on which we relied in Dunn, was not 
a products liability case. This court's recent opinion, Hurley 
v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999), that 
was also not a products liability case, cited Dunn for its 
discussion and holding regarding punitive damages. Id. at 
114. 
 
The centerpiece of the dissent is its reliance on our pre- 
Dunn opinion in Keenan. The dissent fails to point out that 
notwithstanding the "super-deference" to the district court, 
which the dissent claims Keenan requires, in Keenan we 
reversed the punitive damages assessed against one of the 
defendants after finding that there was inadequate evidence 
to support their imposition. 983 F.2d at 471. Moreover, 
Keenan itself undermines the dissent's attempt to cabin 
damages in products liability cases in a separate category. 
Keenan relied for the standard of review for excessiveness 
on an earlier Third Circuit case, Gumbs v. Pueblo 
International, Inc., 823 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1987), where, 
again notwithstanding the deference owed to the district 
court since it granted a remittitur, we reversed the 
imposition of compensatory damages as excessive. The 
Gumbs court in discussing the standard of review, relied on 
an earlier Third Circuit decision, Murray v. Fairbanks 
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Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979), which was a products 
liability case. See Gumbs, 823 F.2d at 771. It is thus 
evident that there is no basis to consider damages in 
products liability cases as a separate category, and we 
certainly did not so suggest in Dunn. 
 
The dissent gives short shrift to Haslip, despite the fact 
that Haslip issued from the Supreme Court, because that 
opinion failed to satisfy Judge Garth's need for "a formulaic 
standard of review." I agree that our task as appellate 
judges in reviewing damages awards, whether or not there 
has been a remittitur, would be facilitated if there were a 
formula, but not all of our review function can be 
compressed into a formula, and the guideposts provided by 
the BMW opinion adequately serve that function. 
 
The cases cited by Judge Garth and those that were 
relied upon in our earlier decision in Keenan  for the 
proposition that we owe heightened deference to the district 
court's remittitur decision -- Delli Santi v. CNA Insurance 
Cos., 88 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1996); Starceski v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995); and Gumbs v. 
Pueblo International, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771-72 (3d Cir. 
1987) -- were all compensatory damages cases and not 
punitive damages cases. In punitive damages cases we 
must be informed by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
and, as noted above, that jurisprudence counsels intensive 
review. 
 
As we noted above, our decision in this case to reduce 
the punitive damages award even further is based upon the 
guideposts established by the Supreme Court. And, in the 
last analysis, we conclude that an award greater than $1 
million is not "reasonably necessary to punish and deter." 
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we will affirm the District Court's decision 
on all grounds raised in this appeal other than the punitive 
damages and will remand so that the District Court can 
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enter a judgment for punitive damages in the amount of $1 
million. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
While I join the Court in its holdings on all of the 
substantive issues discussed in sections II.A through II.D of 
its opinion (with but one caveat stated in the margin),1 I am 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Each of the issues raised by EBI has been more than adequately 
explained and rejected by the majority opinion. However, I note that in 
one area, while I agree with the conclusion that the District Court's 
interpretation of Paragraph 6(d) of the parties' Distributor Agreement, 
containing the "in any way handle" clause precluded EBI from 
manufacturing or producing its own bone fixators during the course of 
the Agreement, I question whether the breadth of the majority's holding 
with respect to the District Court's charge truly represents the 
jurisprudence of this Circuit. 
 
It must be remembered that the District Court had ruled, over EBI's 
objection, in an in limine proceeding that Orthofix's interpretation of 
the 
"in any way handle" clause was correct, which then became the law of 
the case. At the conclusion of the trial, EBI submitted a proposed charge 
that affirmatively incorporated the District Court's interpretation of 
Paragraph 6(d), which the District Court adopted in all respects 
pertinent to this appeal. Once EBI had objected and presented 
arguments in support of its interpretation of Paragraph 6(d) at the in 
limine proceeding, I agree that thereafter EBI was not obliged to object 
to 
the charge of the District Court, which incorporated its in limine ruling, 
in order to preserve the issue on appeal. See , e.g., Smith v. Borough of 
Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998). However, I cannot agree that 
when EBI submitted its own charge that parroted in essential respects 
(i.e., the interpretation of "in any way handle") the District Court's 
ruling, 
that EBI could thereafter raise the issue on appeal, claiming that it had 
preserved the issue, especially when the District Court essentially 
adopted EBI's proposed charge. 
 
I know of no case in our Circuit where the submission of a requested 
charge which was then adopted by the District Court would not foreclose 
the party requesting the charge from thereafter being bound by it. 
Hence, although it does not disturb the disposition reached by the 
majority affirming the District Court's interpretation of Paragraph 6(d) -
- 
a disposition in which I join -- I do raise a question as to the 
expansiveness of the doctrine arguably embraced by the majority. It 
seems to me that our opinion would be far more in tune with our prior 
precedents were we to restrict ourselves to approving preservation of an 
issue only when the affected party had not in effect estopped itself by 
submitting a requested charge which affirmatively incorporated an 
adverse ruling. 
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obliged to write separately in dissent on the issue of 
punitive damages.2 
 
I. 
 
I am compelled to disagree with the majority's reduction 
of the punitive damages assessed against EBI not only 
because that monetary reduction has no principled basis, 
but also because the standard of review that this Court has 
previously established and announced has been totally 
ignored. See Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 
(3d Cir. 1992). While Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir. 
1993) (en banc), to which the majority refers, see Maj. Op. 
at 36, dealt with punitive damages but only in a product 
liability context, i.e., asbestos damage awards, Dunn did not 
provide nor attempt to provide a standard of review that 
contradicted or overruled Keenan. Indeed, Dunn did not 
even cite to Keenan and the Dunn court, which was 
concerned solely with due process considerations, explained 
its result only in terms of successive and multiple damage 
awards which asbestos product liability cases might 
generate, a situation that obviously is not relevant in the 
present case. Neither Dunn nor Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), on which the 
majority relies in Dunn and which I discuss in Section III, 
infra, bear on the standard of review. Instead, the majority 
here has substituted its own discretion and judgment (see 
Maj. Op. at 35-36) -- without warrant from precedent or 
statutory authority -- for our announced standard of 
review, and for that of the District Court, to whose 
discretion and judgment we are bound to give a "super-" 
deference, especially after a grant of remittitur. See also 
Tingley Sys., Inc. v. Norse Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 
1995) (reviewing decision to remit punitive damages under 
abuse of discretion standard; punitive award must"shock 
to conscience" to warrant reversal); Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 
F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995) (reviewing remittitur under 
"considerable deference" standard). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Punitive damages are discussed by the majority in Section II.E of its 
opinion. 
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Struggle as it might, the majority opinion still cannot 
explain why it fails to follow the controlling standard of 
review set forth in Keenan. See Maj. Op. at 37. The majority 
has sought to gloss over the significant differences between 
product liability cases, whose reductions of punitive 
damages awards stem from the fear of multiple and 
successive punitive awards, and cases such as this one 
where no such circumstances obtain. Moreover, the 
majority has not acknowledged that the cases on which it 
relies are fundamentally different from this case, in that 
those cases, such as Haslip and Dunn, were not concerned, 
as we are, with the standard of review, but rather were 
focussed on due process considerations. 
 
Nor is the majority on sound ground when it points out 
that those cases that relied upon our Keenan standard of 
review did not uphold the district court's remittiturs. All 
that argument demonstrates is that the evidence in those 
cases -- Gumbs and Keenan -- did not satisfy our 
heightened standard of review.3 In this case, Judge 
Orlofsky's discretion, based on the overwhelming evidence 
and the jury's 22 special verdict findings, more than 
satisfied that standard. Ergo, our decision should have 
been to affirm rather than to try to explain away what 
cannot be explained. 
 
I recognize that the amounts of money involved are 
extremely substantial, and that even the least of those 
amounts is very significant. A reduction from $100,600,000 
jury verdict to a $50,000,000 remittitur award to the 
$1,000,000 majority award (without principled explanation 
or analysis) is eyebrow-raising. Even if I, like the majority, 
wanted to reduce the jury's award or Judge Orlofsky's 
remittitur because of their respective sizes, I could not 
bring myself to do so because no principled basis exists for 
such a dramatic reduction. I note also that it was because 
of the amount of punitive damages as well as our own 
desire to arrive at a principled formula for their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Of course, insofar as Gumbs was decided before Keenan, it did not 
have the benefit of the fully-enunciated and controlling standard 
established by Keenan, which in turn relied in part, and expanded upon 
Gumbs. 
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ascertainment -- a task at which the majority has not 
succeeded -- that we devoted most of the time allotted at 
oral argument to that subject. 
 
However, we should not and cannot be swayed by the 
dollar amount of the damages if the ultimate decision at 
which we arrive is a principled decision that respects the 
standard of review by which we are bound. Justice 
Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 
(1952) expressed it succinctly when he stated: "We may not 
draw on our merely personal and private notions and 
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function." Our judicial function, as I perceive it, is to 
adhere to our announced standard of review until it is 
overturned by our entire Court or by the Supreme Court. 
 
Thus, my primary focus in this dissent deals with the 
standard by which we must review the District Court's 
remittitur order. It is that standard which dictates the 
result I have reached and which gives rise to theflawed 
majority opinion respecting punitive damages. My 
secondary focus centers on the manner by which the 
majority has reduced Judge Orlofsky's remittitur in 
derogation of precedent and our standard of review. 
 
Therefore, while I agree with the majority's disposition on 
all other issues, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion as to the amount of punitive damages to which 
Orthofix is entitled. Rather, pursuant to our standard of 
review, I would affirm the District Court's remittitur of 
$50,000,000. 
 
II. 
 
This Court's review of a District Court's punitive damage 
remittitur is remarkably circumscribed and consists of 
three elements. We have held that when examining the 
excessiveness of a punitive damages award, our review "is 
[1] severely limited: [2] we may . . . reverse and grant a new 
trial only if the verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock 
the judicial conscience. [3] Where the district judge grants a 
remittitur, deference to the trial court is heightened. Our 
review requires additional deference to the district court 
since it already granted a remittitur." Keenan, 983 F.2d at 
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472 (internal quotations and citations omitted, and 
brackets and emphasis added). Dunn is not to the contrary, 
because as I have pointed out, Dunn is a due 
process/product liability case and it leaves intact the 
standard of review which Keenan announced when a 
district court orders a remittitur. Thus, because the trial 
judge is in the best position to oversee whether the jury 
verdict is rationally based, when the trial judge grants a 
remittitur this Court will not reverse unless wefind the 
District Court abused its discretion when measured against 
our standard of "heightened deference." Gumbs v. Pueblo 
Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771-72 (3d Cir. 1987). See also 
Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1983). Cf. Delli 
Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
Here, the jury awarded Orthofix $100,600,000 in punitive 
damages, a figure it evidently derived from evidence in the 
record indicating that Biomet's cash on hand for the 1996 
fiscal year was approximately $100,600,000. The District 
Court reduced this amount to $50,000,000 in its remittitur 
order, apparently to bring the award in line with the 
compensatory damages of $48,000,000 proven at trial and 
found by the jury. The District Court, which, as the 
majority notes, was "intimately familiar with the case and 
the evidence," Maj. Op. at 24, had been involved with the 
litigation for over three years (including a two month trial) 
and in its discretion had equated the punitive damages to 
the compensatory damages on a 1:1 ratio. 
 
Despite this exercise of the District Court's discretion, a 
discretion that the majority has found not to have been 
abused or to have "shocked the judicial conscience" -- 
indeed, without any principled basis at all, with no 
reference to the record, and in utter disregard of our 
standard of review, the majority has further reduced the 
punitive damages from $50,000,000 to $1,000,000. Nor has 
the majority made any reference in its opinion to the 
"heightened deference" that we owe to the District Court 
when it has granted a remittitur. 
 
The analysis provided by the majority to support its 
peremptory reduction of 98% (based on a reduction to 
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$1,000,000) of the remitted punitive damages award is 
unprecedented in this Circuit. While the majority was 
correct in rejecting EBI's arguments for reduction based 
upon the "alleged passion or prejudice" of the jury, Maj. Op. 
at 28, the majority nonetheless has arbitrarily reduced the 
punitive damages award based only upon its interpretation 
of the "guideposts" found in BMW of North America v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996), and two Tenth Circuit cases that have 
sought to explain them, FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854 
(10th Cir. 1997) and Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. 
OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
520 U.S. 1241 (1997), as well as Dunn, 1 F.3d 1371.4 
 
Specifically, the majority concludes that, based upon 
factors mentioned in those cases, "EBI's conduct, which 
inflicted only economic harm for which large compensatory 
damages have been awarded, was not sufficiently egregious 
to warrant a punitive damages award of $50 million." Maj. 
Op. at 34. I am hard pressed to understand that conclusion 
in light of the jury findings of egregious, intentional and 
deceitful behavior by EBI, and by the lack of record 
evidence in the majority opinion which could shore up such 
a reduced award. 
 
The jury, in its responses on the special verdict sheet, 
answered that it had found by a preponderance of the 
evidence: that EBI intentionally and improperly interfered 
with Orthofix's reasonable expectations of economic 
advantage; that EBI wrongfully and intentionally interfered 
in the contractual relations between Orthofix and Inter 
Medical; that EBI made false statements either knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently that injured Orthofix; that EBI's 
conduct in "passing off " its own products as those of 
Orthofix was likely to cause confusion as to the source of 
those products; that EBI made false statements that 
deceived or were likely to deceive, in violation of the 
Lanham Act and to the likely detriment to Orthofix; that 
EBI had uttered injurious falsehoods in violation of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As I have earlier indicated, I believe the majority's reference to and 
reliance on Dunn is inapposite, as Dunn did not disturb our standard of 
review of remitted punitive damage awards in a non-due process/non- 
product liability context. 
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Lanham Act; and that EBI competed unfairly in violation of 
New Jersey statutory and common law. The jury further 
found by clear and convincing evidence that Orthofix had 
suffered harm as a result of EBI's actions and that EBI's 
conduct was actuated by "actual malice or were 
accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard" of those 
who foreseeably would be harmed by its conduct. 
 
Yet, despite these extraordinary findings, and despite the 
lack of evidentiary support, the majority relies on only one 
aspect of the element of "reprehensibility" 5 in deciding to 
reduce the District Court's remittitur: its conclusion that 
the damages inflicted by EBI were economic in nature. Maj. 
Op. at 33-34. I discuss this aspect of the majority opinion 
in section IV of this dissent, after noting the majority's 
failure to recognize and apply the Third Circuit standard of 
review pertaining to a punitive damages remittitur. 
 
III. 
 
I find fault with the majority opinion because, as I have 
already pointed out, the majority opinion has neglected 
either to state or to apply the standard of review relating to 
punitive damages. See Keenan, 983 F.2d at 472. I have 
recited our standard in the earlier portion of this dissent as 
review that is: 1) extremely limited with reference to the 
District Court's discretion; 2) subject to a "shock the 
conscience" scrutiny; and 3) characterized by a "heightened 
deference" when a remittitur has been granted, as there 
was here. 
 
The majority opinion, in referring to our en banc decision 
in Dunn, which involved the due process impact of multiple 
and successive awards of punitive damages in asbestos- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although BMW is not on point with this case and is therefore 
distinguishable, it nonetheless specifies three guideposts for courts to 
consider in the punitive damages area. First and foremost is the 
egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, i.e., deceit, fraud, etc., 
labeled 
"the degree of reprehensibility." BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. Second, is the 
ratio of punitive damages to "the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff." 
Id. at 580. The third and final guidepost is a comparison to sanctions for 
comparable misconduct. Id. at 583. I agree with the majority that his 
third guidepost is not relevant to this appeal. Maj. Op. at 34. 
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related injury cases, did not specify the standard of our 
review of a District Court's judgment. The nearest Dunn 
came to enunciating such a standard was its reference to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
Haslip stated that an appellate court should determine 
whether a particular award is "greater than reasonably 
necessary to punish and deter" -- hardly a formulaic 
standard of review. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385 (quoting 
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19). That same rubric is repeated by the 
majority in this case. See Maj. Op. at 37 & 38. 
Significantly, however, just as Haslip provides no analysis 
to determine whether a particular award is "greater than 
reasonably necessary to punish and deter," neither does the 
majority here give us the benefit of its analysis and wisdom 
when it concludes (in citing Haslip) that any award larger 
than $1,000,000 is not "reasonably necessary to punish 
and deter." Maj. Op. at 38 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19)). 
 
Hence, I emphasize and maintain that neither Haslip nor 
Dunn6 has superseded this court's prescription held in 
Keenan, providing the appropriate standard of review after 
a remittitur has been ordered. This is particularly so, since 
there has been no endeavor on the part of the majority even 
to acknowledge the specific findings made by the jury and 
to analyze the District Court's opinion. That opinion 
discussed at length the factors to be given consideration 
under the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Dunn, of course, involved Virgin Islands common law, whereas the 
instant appeal is rooted in New Jersey statutory law, which governs the 
ultimate punitive damages award. 
 
7. The New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, among other provisions, 
provides that a jury may award up to 5 times the compensatory damages 
or $350,000, whichever is greater. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14b. The Act is 
careful to circumscribe the essentials for a punitive damage award. It 
requires that the plaintiff prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the harms alleged were caused by the defendant's acts or omissions, and 
that these acts or omissions were "actuated by actual malice or 
accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard" for those who might be 
harmed. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12a. In this case, the jury's special verdict 
findings met each and every requirement of the Act. Hence, the jury's 
punitive damage award could have exceeded even its $100,600,000 
punitive damages award if it had multiplied the $48,000,000 
compensatory damages award by 5. As we note in text, infra, and note 
8, infra, the District Court, in reducing the punitive damage, fully 
addressed all elements of the Act. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12b. 
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Nor does the majority acknowledge that Haslip  obviously 
informed this court's decision in Keenan. Haslip was 
decided in 1991. Keenan was decided a year later, in 1992, 
and Haslip was the subject of discussion in Judge 
Higginbotham's separate opinion. Accordingly, the 
majority's reliance on Haslip has little to do with its lack of 
reliance on Keenan. Further, Keenan's standard of review 
has obviously survived even in light of Dunn because as 
mentioned Dunn has no relevance to the instant appeal. As 
noted, Dunn was a product liability case concerned with the 
implications of multiple and successive punitive damage 
awards as they are affected by principles of due process, 
which explains Dunn's reliance on Haslip . Haslip also 
concerned the due process implications of punitive damage 
awards. 499 U.S. at 18. 
 
A more pertinent precedent -- cited in passing by the 
majority, see Maj. Op. at 28 -- is Browning-Ferris Industries 
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), 
which affirmed a punitive award of $6,066,082.74 and a 
compensatory award of $51,146, a ratio of approximately 
12:1. In so holding, the Supreme Court prescribed that in 
reviewing a district court's decision whether to order a new 
trial on the issue of punitive damages, an appellate court 
has a "limited function" and affirmed the principle that 
appellate court should "continue to accord considerable 
deference" to the district courts. 257 U.S. at 279. 
Undoubtedly, this prescription underlay the adoption by 
our court of the Keenan standard of review. 
 
One appellate court has characterized a jury verdict that 
would "shock the conscience" as one that was so large as 
to be contrary to reason, or so exaggerated as to 
demonstrate the existence of bias or some other improper 
motive. Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 
784 (5th Cir. 1983). Here, however, the majority does not 
hold that either the original jury award or the remitted 
award was so large as to be contrary to reason, nor could 
it. The defendants collectively are entities worth over $1 
billion dollars, and a $50 million punitive damages award 
cannot be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, the majority 
explicitly holds that prejudice or bias was not a factor in 
the award. Maj. Op. at 28. Nor has the majority held (as I 
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suggest it cannot in light of the record) that the District 
Court abused its discretion. Indeed, in its remittitur 
opinion, dated August 28, 1997, the District Court 
identified and discussed at length the seven factors 
required by New Jersey law in assessing whether the 
amount of a punitive damage award was reasonable. 8 
Despite the dictates of our limited standard of review, at no 
point does the majority opinion even discuss this analysis 
by the District Court, nor explain how it believes the 
District Court abused its discretion. 
 
Having failed to explain and having failed to hold that the 
District Court abused its discretion, or that the award 
"shocked the judicial conscience," and having failed to give 
any deference, let alone "heightened deference" to the 
District Court's remittitur, it is evident that the majority 
has also failed to adhere to this Court's established 
standard of review, and has consequently erred in its 
decision. 
 
IV. 
 
The majority's arbitrary reduction in punitive damages to 
$1,000,000 is not justified by the evidence and is without 
any basis in principle or precedent. Moreover, the 
authorities to which the majority has looked for guidance, 
argue instead for affirming the District Court's remittitur. 
Indeed, no case cited by the majority has held definitively 
that cases involving only economic controversies warrant a 
lower punitive damages award than those involving non- 
economic damages such as threats to public health. 
 
While the BMW Court suggested that economic harm 
alone is not normally associated with "particularly 
reprehensible conduct," 517 U.S. at 576, that is only one 
element of the "reprehensibility" analysis. See Continental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court considered the following: 1) the likelihood of 
serious 
harm resulting from EBI's misconduct; 2) EBI's awareness or reckless 
disregard of that likelihood; 3) EBI's conduct upon learning that their 
initial misconduct would likely cause harm; 4) the duration or any 
concealment of the misconduct; 5) the profitability of the misconduct; 6) 
when the misconduct was terminated; and 7) EBI'sfinancial condition. 
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Trend Resources, 101 F.3d at 638; Lee v. Edwards, 101 
F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996) (listing other elements). The other 
elements which must be taken into account, such as 
intentionality, repetitive conduct, and conduct involving 
deliberate false statements, etc., were all found by the jury 
to have occurred in this case. 
 
However, evidence produced at trial, but not mentioned 
in the majority opinion, indicated that EBI's conduct could 
involve potential physical harm to the wider community as 
well as economic harm. EBI was found liable for passing off 
its own products as those of Orthofix, a recognized and 
respected manufacturer of bone fixators. There is evidence 
in the record that on at least one occasion, the deceptive 
substitution of EBI bone screws and ankle clamps for use 
in conjunction with Orthofix fixators could have injured 
patients. Therefore, the jury could well have concluded that 
the deceptive practices engaged in by EBI not only caused 
economic damage to Orthofix, but also exposed orthopedic 
patients to increased harm, to say nothing of the liability of 
hospitals when they unknowingly used EBI's bone screws 
and clamps believing them to have been manufactured by 
Orthofix. Even if this evidence is disregarded-- as the 
majority disregards it -- and even if one focuses only on the 
economic aspects of the damages caused by EBI, this Court 
must still affirm by deferring to the District Court's 
remittitur. 
 
As mentioned, EBI was found to have engaged in a series 
of continuous and intentional deceptive acts in order to 
steal a market from Orthofix worth approximately $95 
million. This evidence, which the majority credits, Maj. Op. 
at 33-34, is more than sufficient to justify the jury's finding 
of reprehensible conduct, which is the "most important 
indicium" among the guideposts.9 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
See also note 5, supra. That finding distinguishes this case 
from BMW in which the Supreme Court found "none of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Indeed, the majority concedes that the full award of compensatory 
damages can be credited to EBI's tortious conduct: "[t]he breaches of 
contract here were so intertwined with the tortious scheme to steal 
Orthofix's market that the full award is properly attributable to the 
tortious conduct." Maj. Op. at 27. 
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aggravating factors" associated with reprehensible conduct. 
517 U.S. at 576. Indeed, the Supreme Court in BMW 
indicated that cases involving such deceptive conduct 
would justify a high punitive award. 517 U.S. at 576 
("[I]nfliction of economic injury, especially when done 
intentionally through affirmative acts of misconduct . . . 
can warrant a substantial penalty"). Cf. Balsamides v. 
Perle, 712 A.2d 673, 685 (N.J. App. Div.) (stating punitive 
damages can be awarded for breach of contract in 
commercial dispute where there has been a "breach of trust 
beyond the contractual breach"), certif. granted, 719 A.2d 
1023 (N.J. 1998). 
 
The specific cases relied upon by the majority do not 
support its holding that economic damages alone justify a 
lowering of a punitive damages award. While the Tenth 
Circuit in Continental Trend Resources and Hamilton did 
discuss the economic nature of the damages, the holdings 
of those cases were far more concerned with the 
constitutionality of the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages -- another of BMW's "guideposts." 
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 580. 
 
The majority understandably does not dwell on the ratio 
of the jury's compensatory damages award of $48,000,000 
to its proposed punitive damage award of $1,000,000. It 
makes no such comparison because in each of the cases 
cited, the punitive damages were far greater than the 
compensatory damages. BMW, which focussed on the ratio 
between punitive damages and compensatory damages, 
implicitly assumed the former would be higher than the 
latter in most cases. 517 U.S. at 580-82. Under the 
majority's approach here, the opposite is true and the 
majority's reliance upon BMW suffers because of that fact. 
 
On the other hand, Judge Orlofsky's remittitur of 
$50,000,000, which I would affirm, when compared to the 
compensatory damages of $48,000,000, is essentially a 1:1 
ratio, and well within the guidepost of BMW. The District 
Court's remittitur ratio is also a far more acceptable ratio 
than even the 6:1 ratio found to be permissible by the 
Tenth Circuit, or the 4:1 ratio affirmed in Haslip. See 
Hamilton, 122 F.3d at 862; Continental Trend Resources, 
101 F.3d at 643. Indeed, the Supreme Court has intimated 
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that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages could be even higher than 6:1 in economic 
damages cases taking into account the damages that would 
have accrued had the defendant succeeded in its egregious 
conduct. BMW, 517 U.S. at 581 (approving a 10:1 ratio in 
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 
443 (1993) and stating that punitive damages should be 
assessed in the context of harm that was likely  to occur as 
well as harm that did occur)). See also Browning-Ferris, 492 
U.S. 257 (12:1); Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 
1999) (4:1 ratio); Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co., 108 
F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (6:1 ratio). 
 
V. 
 
Finally, I take issue with the standard against which the 
majority measured its award of punitive damages. The 
majority standard, rather than relying on our standard of 
review, alarmingly requires instead that an appellate panel 
"must rely on its combined experience and judgment" when 
reducing a remittitur. Maj. Op. at 36. The majority 
therefore, consonant only with its own devised standard 
and with reference only to its own judgment, holds, in 
conclusory fashion, that "[a]fter reviewing the record and 
the arguments in this case, we conclude that the proper, 
reasonable punitive damages award is no more than $1 
million." Maj. Op. at 36. Any amount greater than that, the 
majority concludes, would not be "reasonably necessary to 
punish and deter." Maj. Op. at 38. As I have indicated, no 
analysis accompanies this ipse dixit conclusion. 
 
Not only does this mysterious and unauthorized standard 
provide no instruction to the trial courts or litigants, but, 
as I have discussed above, it totally ignores our 
precedential standard of review, announced in Keenan, 983 
F.2d 459, under which we are obligated to give additional 
deference to the district court's experience and judgment 
except where the award shocks the conscience or when the 
district court has abused its discretion. Here, the majority 
has followed its own "merely personal and private 
judgment" in arriving at a proper amount of punitive 
damages, rather than confining itself to "the limits that 
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bind judges in their judicial function." See Rochin, 342 U.S. 
at 170. 
 
VI. 
 
I acknowledge that punitive damages continue to be a 
problem vexing both the state and federal courts. See Milo 
Geyelin, Philip Morris Hit with Record Damages , WALL ST. 
J., March 31, 1999, at A3 (reporting punitive damage award 
of $80.3 million); Milo Geyelin, Jury Awards $50 Million to 
Ex-Smoker, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1999, at A3 ($51.5 
million). Yet, neither the state nor federal courts have 
fashioned a sure-fire recipe to solve the question of "how 
much,"10 even though we have prescribed a formula -- our 
standard of review -- to be employed. 
 
Nevertheless, a Court of Appeals cannot "willy-nilly," in 
an effort to reach what it considers to be the "right figure," 
arbitrarily pull a punitive damage award from the air as if 
it were a lottery number and announce "in our judgment," 
this is it! I feel strongly that a court of review, such as we 
are, must not only furnish guidelines to the bench and bar, 
but even more importantly, it must set an example of 
correct judicial behavior by adhering to announced 
principles of jurisprudence. To do so, it must remain 
"within the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function." See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170. Failure to do so can 
lead only to arbitrary, capricious and/or emotional 
judgments beyond the realm of principle. 
 
In this case, I believe the majority's decision, excellent in 
all other respects, has failed to adhere to its proper judicial 
function when speaking to the issue of punitive damages. It 
has failed to recognize what the court must regard as our 
declared standard of review -- see Keenan, Gumbs, Delli 
Santi, Starceski, supra, etc. At the very least, the majority 
opinion has now added confusion to this court's standard 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In an effort to alleviate this problem, New Jersey, and recently 
Alabama, have joined a growing number of states which have responded 
with legislation governing the award of punitive damages. See BMW, 517 
U.S. at 614-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing in appendix state 
statutes governing punitive damage awards). 
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by referring to a "standard" derived from inapposite cases 
which pre-existed Keenan. It has substituted its personal 
judgment for a principled review function over a District 
Court's discretion; and without relying on record evidence, 
it has reached a bottom line "lottery" figure of $1,000,000 
relying only on its own "experience and judgment." Maj. Op. 
at 36. Such a practice is neither principled jurisprudence 
nor is it Third Circuit jurisprudence. If the majority now 
holds that, in light of the sequence of cases -- Haslip in 
1991, Keenan in 1992, and Dunn in 1993 -- and in light of 
the materially different contexts of these cases, that our 
remittitur standard of review has now been whittled down 
so that no analysis aside from an ad hoc panel's "combined 
experience and judgment" is required in reviewing a district 
court's remittitur, then all the more reason why this court 
must address and resolve this confusion by establishing 
firm guidelines. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the standard of 
review and the resulting punitive damage award announced 
by the majority. Instead, I would affirm the District Court's 
remittitur of $50,000,000. 
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